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Abstract
We study the high-frequency limits of strategies and costs in a Nash equilibrium for two agents that
are competing to minimize liquidation costs in a discrete-time market impact model with exponentially
decaying price impact and quadratic transaction costs of size θ ≥ 0. We show that, for θ = 0, equilibrium
strategies and costs will oscillate indefinitely between two accumulation points. For θ > 0, however,
strategies, costs, and total transaction costs will converge towards limits that are independent of θ. We
then show that the limiting strategies form a Nash equilibrium for a continuous-time version of the model
with θ equal to a certain critical value θ∗ > 0, and that the corresponding expected costs coincide with
the high-frequency limits of the discrete-time equilibrium costs. For θ 6= θ∗, however, continuous-time
Nash equilibria will typically not exist. Our results permit us to give mathematically rigorous proofs of
numerical observations made in [28]. In particular, we provide a range of model parameters for which the
limiting expected costs of both agents are decreasing functions of θ. That is, for sufficiently high trading
speed, raising additional transaction costs can reduce the expected costs of all agents.
MSC classification: 91A05, 91A10, 91A25, 49N70, 91A60, 91A80, 91G10, 91G80
Keywords: Market impact game, transient price impact, Nash equilibrium, high-frequency limit, transaction
costs
1 Introduction
In this paper, we continue the analysis of a market impact game started in [30] and [28]. In this game,
two agents compete to minimize liquidation costs in a discrete-time market impact model with transient
price impact. Such market impact models are typically used to describe situations in which orders arrive
fast enough to be affected by the reversion of the price impact created by previous trades [7, 26, 2, 4]. The
observations in [30] and [28] show that the qualitative behavior of Nash equilibria in models with transient
impact is drastically different from the one of Nash equilibria in Almgren–Chriss-type models, in which
orders are supposed to arrive slow enough to not be affected by any transient price impact component; we
refer to [10, 31, 12, 29] for analyses of market impact games in the context of the Almgren–Chriss model.
A discrete-time market impact game with asymmetric information was analyzed in [25]. Other applications
of game theory to issues of market microstructures include [8, 9, 11, 22, 19]. General background on
market impact models and the corresponding optimization problems can be found in the book [13], the two
surveys [17, 23], and the references therein.
Specifically, it was shown in [30] and [28] that the equilibrium strategies of both agents typically oscillate
between buy and sell trades, a behavior that is reminiscent of the “hot-potato game” during the 2010 flash
∗Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, and Department of Mathematics, University of
Mannheim, Email: alex.schied@gmail.com
∗∗Department of Mathematics, University of Mannheim, Email: estrehle@mail.uni-mannheim.de
§Department of Mathematics, University of Mannheim, Email: taozhang.de@gmail.com
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through Research Grants
SCHI/3-1 and SCHI/3-2. In preliminary form, parts of this paper were published in the third author’s doctoral dissertation [34].
1
ar
X
iv
:1
50
9.
08
28
1v
5 
 [q
-fi
n.T
R]
  9
 M
ay
 20
17
crash [14]. This behavior can be interpreted as a protection against predatory trading by the competitor.
Oscillations of trading strategies can of course be dampened by adding additional transaction costs for
each trade. To study the effects of transaction costs on equilibrium strategies, [28] introduced quadratic
transactions costs whose size is controlled by a parameter θ ≥ 0. Varying θ leads to a number of surprising
effects. For instance, it was shown in [28, Theorem 2.7] that there exists an explicitly given critical value
θ∗ > 0 such that the equilibrium strategies show at least some oscillations for θ < θ∗, whereas all oscillations
disappear for θ ≥ θ∗.
The most surprising observations, however, concern the behavior of the expected liquidation costs. First,
by means of numerical computations, it was illustrated in [28] that the expected costs of both agents can
in some regimes be decreasing functions of the size of transaction costs. That is, all market participants
can be better off on average if additional transaction costs are imposed. Second, numerical simulations
show that, for small θ, expected costs can be (essentially) increasing functions of the trading frequency,
although a higher frequency means that agents can draw from a larger class of strategies and thus should in
principle be able to apply more cost-efficient strategies. This picture changes, however, if transaction costs
are increased. If θ is sufficiently large (e.g., if θ ≥ θ∗) the expected costs become decreasing functions of the
trading frequency.
The two phenomena described in the preceding paragraph can again be explained by the need of protect-
ing against predatory trading. First, an increase of transaction costs discourages predatory trading so that
both traders need to take fewer precautions and thus can use more cost-efficient strategies. The correspond-
ing savings can exceed the extra expenses in transaction costs and thus lead to an overall reduction of costs
for all market participants. Second, an increase of the trading frequency also increases the opportunities
for predatory trading so that additional protective measures need to be taken if transaction costs are small.
The cost of these measures can outweigh the benefit of higher trading frequency, thus leading to an increase
of the expected costs. The situation changes if predatory trading has been sufficiently discouraged through
higher transaction costs. In this case we observe the usual decrease of the expected costs as a function of
the trading frequency.
One of the main goals of the present paper is to provide mathematical proof and justification for the
numerical observations made in [28]. Our main corresponding result will be Corollary 3.3, which provides
a range of model parameters that are sufficient for the expected costs of both agents to be decreased by
raising additional transaction costs.
The proof of Corollary 3.3 is based on a thorough analysis of the behavior of equilibrium strategies
and expected costs in the high-frequency limit, which is also interesting in its own right and exhibits a
number of surprising features of our market impact game. In Theorem 3.1 we will study the asymptotics
of the accumulate equilibrium strategies. We show that, for θ = 0, these strategies oscillate indefinitely
between two limiting curves, which we identify explicitly. For all θ > 0, however, the strategies converge to
continuous-time limits that are given explicitly and are independent of θ. This result will also be needed as
input for the proof of Theorem 3.2, which deals with the asymptotics of the expected costs in equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2 states that, for θ = 0, the expected costs oscillate indefinitely and in the limit have exactly two
distinct accumulation points, which are given in closed form. Again, the picture is different for θ > 0. In
this case, the expected costs converge to an explicit limit that is independent of θ. A comparison between
this limit and the two accumulation points for θ = 0 then yields the above-mentioned Corollary 3.3.
The convergence of the equilibrium strategies and costs raises the question whether the limiting strategies
and costs can be associated with a continuous-time version of our market impact game. A corresponding
continuous-time setup is provided in Section 3 by drawing on the existing literature for continuous-time
market impact models with transient price impact [16, 18, 27, 24, 3, 1]. Theorem 4.5, our corresponding
main result, states that, for θ equal to the above-mentioned critical value θ∗, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium that consists exactly of the limiting strategies found in the high-frequency limit of our discrete-
time market impact game. Moreover, the expected costs of that equilibrium are equal to the high-frequency
limits of the discrete-time costs (Corollary 4.6). However, Theorem 4.5 states also that for θ 6= θ∗ no Nash
equilibrium exists if at least one agent holds nontrivial inventory. Preliminary versions of the results from
Section 3 and their proofs were stated earlier in the third author’s doctoral dissertation [34].
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To sum up, we show that, for θ = 0, equilibrium strategies and costs will oscillate indefinitely and not
converge to any limit. For θ > 0, however, both strategies and costs will converge towards limits that are
independent of θ. These limits also appear in the unique continuous-time Nash equilibrium for θ = θ∗,
which is essentially the only Nash equilibrium that exists in continuous time.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the setup and the main results from [28] in the
form in which they are needed here. In Section 3 we state our asymptotic results on the high-frequency limits
of equilibrium strategies and costs. Continuous-time Nash equilibria are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
prepares for the proofs of our main results by algebraically establishing explicit formulas for the discrete-time
equilibrium strategies; the corresponding main result is Theorem 5.4. The sections in the appendix contain
the proofs of our main results.
2 Preliminaries
Let us briefly recall the setup and the main results of [28] in the special form in which they will be need
here (the setup of [28] is more general). We consider two financial agents who are active in a market impact
model for one risky asset. Price impact will be transient and modeled by means of the exponential decay
kernel,
G(t) = λe−ρt, t ≥ 0,
where ρ > 0. There is no loss of generality in taking λ = 1 for the remainder of this paper, as all other
quantities can be scaled accordingly. Transient price impact was proposed in [7], and the first analysis of a
model with exponential decay of price impact was given in [26]. See, e.g., [2, 16, 4, 18, 27, 24, 3, 1, 15] for
further analyses and extensions of this model, which is sometimes called a propagator model.
If none of the two agents is active, asset prices are described by a right-continuous martingale S0 =
(S0t )t≥0 on a filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0,F ,P), for which (Ft)t≥0 is right-continuous and F0 is
P-trivial. The process S0 is often called the unaffected price process. Trading takes place at the discrete
trading times of a time grid T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, where 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T . Both agents are
assumed to use trading strategies that are admissible in the following sense:
Definition 2.1. An admissible trading strategy for T and z ∈ R is a vector ζ = (ζ0, . . . , ζN ) of random
variables such that each ζi is Fti-measurable and bounded, and z = ζ0 + · · · + ζN P-a.s. The set of all
admissible strategies for given T and z is denoted by X (z,T).
For ζ ∈X (z,T), the value of ζi is taken as the number of shares traded at time ti, with a positive sign
indicating a sell order and a negative sign indicating a purchase. Thus, z is the inventory of the agent at
time 0 = t0, and by time tN = T the agent must have a zero inventory. The assumption that each ζi is
bounded can be made without loss of generality from an economic point of view.
If the two agents apply the respective strategies ξ ∈ X (x,T) and η ∈ X (y,T), the asset price is given
by
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t −
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)(ξk + ηk).
Based on this definition of an impacted price process, one can derive the following definition of transaction
costs for each of the two agents.
Definition 2.2. Suppose that T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, x and y are given. Let furthermore θ ≥ 0 and (εi)i=0,1,...
be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli (12)-distributed random variables that are independent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft). Then
the costs of ξ ∈X (x,T) given η ∈X (y,T) are defined as
CT(ξ|η) = xS00 +
N∑
k=0
(G(0)
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εkG(0)ξkηk + θξ2k
)
(1)
and the costs of η given ξ are
CT(η|ξ) = yS00 +
N∑
k=0
(G(0)
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + (1− εk)G(0)ξkηk + θη2k
)
. (2)
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In the preceding definition, εk is a random variable that determines whether the first or the second
agent’s order is executed first, when both agents place orders at the same instance. In addition to the
endogenous liquidation costs, each trade ζk also incurs quadratic transaction costs of the form θζ
2
k , whose
size is determined by the parameter θ ≥ 0. Such quadratic transaction costs are often used to model
“slippage” arising from temporary price impact; see [6, 5] and [16, Section 2.2]. Nevertheless, proportional
transaction costs might be more realistic in many situations, and so the question arises to what extend
results will change when the quadratic transaction costs θξ2k are replaced by (piecewise) linear transaction
costs. This question will be discussed in Remark 2.5 below.
As usual, for a given time grid T and initial values x, y ∈ R, a Nash equilibrium is a pair (ξ∗,η∗) of
strategies in X (x,T)×X (y,T) such that
E[CT(ξ∗|η∗) ] = min
ξ∈X (X0,T)
E[CT(ξ|η∗) ] and E[CT(η∗|ξ∗) ] = min
η∈X (Y0,T)
E[CT(η|ξ∗) ].
This definition assumes implicitly that each agent has full knowledge of the other agent’s initial inventory
(x or y, respectively) and strategy (ξ∗ or η∗, respectively).
The existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies and with θ = 0 was
established in [30, Theorem 9.1]. This result was then extended in [28] to general decay kernels, adapted
strategies, and arbitrary θ ≥ 0. Even more importantly, an explicit formula for the equilibrium strategies
was given that allows for the qualitative analysis of equilibrium strategies and costs, which will be continued
in the present paper. We now recall this existence result from [28] in the specific setting of exponential
decay of price impact and for the equidistant time grids,
TN =
{kT
N
∣∣∣ k = 0, 1, . . . , N}, N = 2, 3, . . .
To this end, we fix N and we define the lower triangular (N + 1)× (N + 1)-matrix Γ˜ by
(Γ˜)ij =

0 if i < j,
1/2 if i = j,
e−ρ(i−j)T/N if i > j.
We then denote the transposition of matrices and vectors with the symbol >, and let
Γ := Γ˜ + Γ˜>
be the so-called Kac–Murdock–Szego˝ matrix. Let Id denote the (N + 1) × (N + 1)-identity matrix and 1
the (N + 1)-column vector that contains only ones. Define the (N + 1)-column vectors
ν := (Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id)−11 and ω := (Γ− Γ˜ + 2θ Id)−11;
both vectors are well-defined by [28, Lemma 3.2]. In Theorem 5.4 we will derive closed-form representations
for both ν and ω. Let furthermore
v :=
1
1>ν
ν and w :=
1
1>ω
ω (3)
denote the corresponding normalized vectors; again, the denominators are nonzero by [28, Lemma 3.2].
Theorem 2.3 (Theorem 2.5 in [28]). For any ρ > 0, θ ≥ 0, time grid T, and initial values x, y ∈ R,
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈X (x,T)×X (y,T). The optimal strategies ξ∗ and η∗ are
deterministic and given by
ξ∗ =
1
2
(x+ y)v +
1
2
(x− y)w and η∗ = 1
2
(x+ y)v − 1
2
(x− y)w.
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It was observed in [30] and [28] that, for vanishing transaction costs (i.e., θ = 0), the equilibrium
strategies may display strong oscillations with alternating buy and sell trades. These oscillations can be
interpreted as a protection against predatory trading by the competitor [30, 28]. When transaction costs
increase, these oscillations are dampened and they finally disappear when transaction costs reach a specific
critical level θ∗. This is the content of the following result from [28] for the specific case of exponential decay
of price impact.
Theorem 2.4 (Theorem 2.7 in [28]). The following conditions are equivalent.
(a) For every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of v are nonnegative.
(b) For every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of w are nonnegative.
(c) θ ≥ θ∗ = 1/4.
A very surprising numerical observation made in [28, Section 2.4] is that the expected costs of both
agents can decrease when transaction costs increase; see Figure 1. Economically, this phenomenon can be
interpreted as follows. An increase of transaction costs leads to a decrease of predatory trading. Therefore,
both traders need to take fewer precautions against predatory trading and thus can use more efficient
strategies. The savings from the preceding effect can sometimes exceed the extra expenses in increased
transaction costs, thus leading to an overall reduction of costs for all market participants. An additional
effect is that an increase of transaction costs reduces the volume that is traded and thus can “calm the
market”.
One of the main goals of the present paper is to give a mathematical proof and a quantitative analysis
of the above-mentioned numerical observation from [28, Section 2.4]. To this end, the following sections
will analyze the high-frequency limit of equilibrium strategies and costs, i.e., the limit when N ↑ ∞. Before
that, however, we conclude this section by recalling a discussion from [28] on how results might be impacted
if our quadratic transactions were replaced by (piecewise) linear ones.
Remark 2.5 (Quadratic versus proportional transaction costs). It was shown in [28, Proposition 2.6] that
in the context of Theorem 2.3 there exists a piecewise linear function τ of the form
τ(|x|) = θ0|x|+
M∑
k=1
θk(|x| − ck)1[ck,∞)(|x|) (4)
with certain coefficients θk > 0 and thresholds 0 < c1 < · · · cM such that (ξ∗,η∗) is also a Nash equilibrium
in X (x,T)×X (y,T) for the the modified expected cost functional in which the quadratic transaction cost
function x 7→ θx2 in (1) and (2) is replaced with x 7→ τ(|x|). Transaction costs of the form (4) can model
a transaction tax that is subject to tax progression. With such a tax, small orders, such as those placed
by small investors, are taxed at a lower rate than large orders, which may be placed with the intention of
moving the market. Moreover, since the main difference of quadratic and proportional transaction costs
is their behavior at the origin, one may guess that similar results as recalled in this section for quadratic
transaction costs and fixed N might also hold for proportional transaction costs. Nevertheless, the function
τ for which the above-mentioned result holds depends on all model parameters and in particular on N .
We can therefore not expect that the limiting results obtained in the following sections remain valid if our
quadratic transaction cost function is replaced by proportional transaction costs in a neighborhood of the
origin. Indeed, in the limit N ↑ ∞, individual trades of the equilibrium strategies can become arbitrarily
small, and so the differences between quadratic and proportional transaction costs become crucial.
3 High-frequency limits for equilibrium strategies and costs
Let us introduce
nt :=
⌈Nt
T
⌉
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Figure 1: Expected costs E[CTN (ξ|η)] as a function of trading frequency, N , for θ = 0, θ = 0.05, and
θ = θ∗ = 1/4 if ρT = 1 and x = y = 1.
and the renormalized strategies
V
(N)
t := 1−
nt∑
k=1
vk and W
(N)
t = 1−
nt∑
k=1
wk, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where v = (v1, . . . , vN+1)
> and w = (w1, . . . , wN+1)> are as in (3). To keep the notation simple, we will
not make the dependence of v, w, and of many other quantities on N explicit. Our first main result will
deal with the asymptotics of V (N) and W (N).
Theorem 3.1 (Asymptotics of strategies). The renormalized strategies V (N) and W (N) behave as follows
as N ↑ ∞.
(a) If θ > 0, then V
(N)
0 = 1 and
V
(N)
t −→
e3ρT
(
6ρ (T − t) + 4)− 4e3ρt
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1 , 0 < t ≤ T.
(b) For θ = 0, we define the functions f±, g± : [0, T ]→ R by
f± (t) :=
(
2e6ρT (3ρT + 5) + e3ρT + 3ρT + 7
)−1 (± 3e3ρ(T−t) ± 6e3ρ(2T−t) +
+ e6ρT
(
6ρ (T − t) + 4)+ 3ρ (T − t) + 2e3ρT + 4e3ρt − 4e3ρ(T+t) + 3),
g± (t) :=
(
2e6ρT (3ρT + 5)− 3e3ρT − 3ρT − 7
)−1 (± 3e3ρ(T−t) ± 6e3ρ(2T−t) +
+ e6ρT
(
6ρ (T − t) + 4)− 3ρ (T − t)− 2e3ρT − 4e3ρt − 4e3ρ(T+t) − 3).
Then V
(N)
0 = 1, and for 0 < t ≤ T the sequence (V (2N)t )N∈N has exactly the two cluster points f+ (t)
and f−(t), and (V
(2N+1)
t )N∈N has exactly the two cluster points g+ (t) and g−(t).
(c) If θ > 0, then
W
(N)
t −→
ρ(T − t) + 1
ρT + 1
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
(d) For θ = 0, we define the functions ϕ±, ψ± : [0, T ]→ R by
ϕ±(t) :=
1 + ρ(T − t)± e−ρ(T−t)
1 + ρT + e−ρT
,
ψ±(t) :=
1 + ρ(T − t)± e−ρ(T−t)
1 + ρT − e−ρT .
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Figure 2: Convergence of V
(75)
t (blue) to V (red) for small but nonzero θ (left) and large θ (right).
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Figure 3: W (50) (left) and V (50) (right) in blue for θ = 0, together with the corresponding limits of oscillations
from Theorem 3.1 (b) and (d) in red.
Then W
(N)
T = 0, and for 0 ≤ t < T the sequence (W (2N)t )N∈N has exactly the two cluster points ϕ+ (t)
and ϕ−(t), and (W
(2N+1)
t )N∈N has exactly the two cluster points ψ+ (t) and ψ−(t).
Note that the limits in parts (a) and (c) of the preceding theorem are independent of the particular value
of θ > 0. A similar effect occurs in the asymptotics of the expected costs, as can be seen from part (a) of
the following result.
Theorem 3.2 (Asymptotics of expected costs). For x, y ∈ R and N ≥ 2, let ξ(N) ∈ X (x,TN ) and
η(N) ∈X (y,TN ) be the corresponding equilibrium strategies.
(a) If θ > 0, then
lim
N↑∞
E
[
CTN (ξ
(N)|η(N))
]
=
(x+ y)2
(
36e6ρT (8ρT + 13)− 60e3ρT − 3
)
16
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1)2 + x
2 − y2
2 (ρT + 1)
+
(x− y)2
16 (ρT + 1)2
.
(b) If θ = 0, then
lim
N↑∞
E
[
CT2N (ξ
(2N)|η(2N))
]
=
(x+ y)2
(
6e6ρT + 3
)
2
(
2e6ρT (3ρT + 5) + e3ρT + 3ρT + 7
) + x2 − y2
2
(
e−ρT + ρT + 1
) ,
and
lim
N↑∞
E
[
CT2N+1(ξ
(2N+1)|η(2N+1))
]
=
(x+ y)2
(
6e6ρT − 3
)
2
(
2e6ρT (3ρT + 5)− 3e3ρT − 3ρT − 7) + x2 − y22 (−e−ρT + ρT + 1) .
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Figure 4: Regions of (x, y) ∈ [−5, 5] × [−5, 5] for which the limit of the expected costs E[CTN (ξ(N)|η(N))]
for θ = θ∗ = 1/4 is strictly lower than the limit inferior of the expected costs if θ = 0, for ρT = 0.69 (blue),
ρT = 3 (green), and ρT = 6 (orange).
With the cost limits stated in the preceding theorem, we can now prove in a mathematically rigorous
fashion that increasing the transaction costs level θ can sometimes lower the expected costs of all market
participants. This statement is made precise in the following corollary and illustrated in Figure 3.
Corollary 3.3. Let x = y and ρT > log(4 +
√
62/2)/3 ≈ 0.69. Then the limit of the expected costs
E[CTN (ξ(N)|η(N))] for θ > 0 is strictly lower than the limit inferior of the expected costs for θ = 0.
In our analysis, we have considered the high-frequency limit N ↑ ∞ while taking all other model pa-
rameters, notably ρ, as constant. In reality, one might expect that an increase of the trading frequency also
leads to a more resilient market. That is, ρ might increase with N . Note that Corollary 3.3 requires only a
condition of the form ρ > c for some constant c. Therefore we can expect the conclusion of Corollary 3.3 to
be robust if the framework is replaced by a variant in which ρ increases with N . Moreover, it was observed
numerically in [28] that, for fixed and finite N , the expected costs E[CTN (ξ(N)|η(N))] can be a decreasing
function of θ as long as θ remains sufficiently small.
The quadratic transaction costs in our model can also be interpreted as a quadratic transaction tax,
with θ ≥ 0 acting as the tax rate. Corollary 3.3 shows that such a tax can sometimes make everyone better
off and also generate some additional tax revenue. To analyze the tradeoff between the generation of tax
revenues and additional costs in greater detail, we introduce the following definitions.
Definition 3.4. If N ∈ N, the tax rate is θ, and ξ(N) ∈ X (x,TN ) and η(N) ∈ X (y,TN ) are the corre-
sponding equilibrium strategies, the total tax revenues are
TRN := θ
(
ξ(N)
)>
ξ(N) + θ
(
η(N)
)>
η(N)
The total costs are defined as
CN (θ) := E[CTN (ξ
(N)|η(N))] + E[CTN (η(N)|ξ(N))],
and the total taxation costs are
TCN := CN (θ)− CN (0).
The asymptotic behavior of the total taxation costs TCN is known from Theorem 3.2. For the asymp-
totic behavior of the total tax revenues, we have the following result. It shows that the tax revenues are
asymptotically independent of the tax rate θ and that they dominate the total taxation costs; see also
Figure 5. In this sense, it is beneficial in our model to levy a small transaction tax.
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Figure 5: Total tax revenues, TRN , and total taxation costs, TCN , for N = 2, . . . , 100 and x = 1, y = 1/2,
ρT = 1, and θ = θ∗ = 1/4.
Corollary 3.5. For θ > 0 and initial positions x, y ∈ R,
TRN −→ (x+ y)
2 9(1 + 2e3ρT )2
8(1− 2e3ρT (5 + 3ρT ))2 +
(x− y)2
8(ρT + 1)2
as N ↑ ∞.
Moreover,
lim inf
N↑∞
(TRN − TCN ) =
(x+ y)2 3
(
2e3ρT + 1
)2 (
3(ρT + 3) + 2e6ρT (3ρT + 5)− e3ρT (12ρT + 19)
)
2
(
1− 2e3ρT (3ρT + 5))2 (3ρT + e3ρT + 2e6ρT (3ρT + 5) + 7)
and this expression is always nonnegative and strictly positive if x 6= −y.
4 Nash equilibrium in continuous time
In view of the convergence results from the preceding section, it is natural to ask whether the obtained limits
are possibly related to a Nash equilibrium in a continuous-time extension of our model. To this end, we now
introduce a continuous-time version of the primary model. Previous versions of this section’s statements
and their proofs were first stated in the third author’s doctoral dissertation [34].
4.1 Definition of admissible strategies and Nash equilibria
We first define admissible strategies in continuous time. Various definitions of such strategies have been
given in the literature [16, 18, 27, 24, 3, 1]; here we use the one from [24], where strategies are right-
continuous but may jump immediately at time t = 0 and thus need a starting value Z0− = z immediately
before time t = 0.
Definition 4.1. A strategy (Zt)t≥0− is called admissible, if it satisfies the following conditions:
• (Zt)t≥0 is adapted to the filtration (Ft)t≥0;
• the function t 7→ Zt is P-a.s. right-continuous and bounded;
• the function t 7→ Zt has finite and P-a.s. bounded total variation;
• there exists T > 0 such that Zt = 0 P-a.s. for all t ≥ T .
We denote the class of all admissible strategies Z with initial value Z0− = z and time horizon T by
X (z, [0, T ]).
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If two agents use the admissible strategies X and Y , the affected price SX,Y is defined as
SX,Yt = S
0
t +
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dXs +
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs,
where the integrals are Stieltjes integrals. As in [24], our definition of the liquidation costs in a two-
player setting will be motivated by a discrete-time approximation. To this end, let X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]),
Y ∈X (y, [0, T ]), and N ∈ N be given. For tNk := kT/N ∈ TN , we define the following discretized trades
ξN0 := X0 −X0− and ξNk := XtNk −XtNk−1 for k = {1, 2, . . . , N};
ηN0 := Y0 − Y0− and ηNk := YtNk − YtNk−1 for k = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Then ξN ∈ X (x,TN ) and ηN ∈ X (y,TN ). Furthermore, for each N ∈ N let (εNk )k∈{0,1,...,N} be a se-
quence of i.i.d. Bernoulli (12)-distributed random variables that are independent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft). According
to Definition 2.2, we have,
CTN (ξ
N |ηN ) :=xS00− +
N∑
k=0
(1
2
(ξNk )
2 − SξN ,ηN
tNk
ξNk + ε
N
k ξ
N
k η
N
k + θ(ξ
N
k )
2
)
,
CTN (η
N |ξN ) :=yS00− +
N∑
k=0
(1
2
(ηNk )
2 − SξN ,ηN
tNk
ηNk + (1− εNk )ξNk ηNk + θ(ηNk )2
)
.
In the following lemma, we obtain the convergence of the expected liquidation costs. Its proof is analogous
to the one of [24, Lemma 1] and hence omitted.
Lemma 4.2. As N ↑ ∞, we have
E[CTN (ξ
N |ηN )] −→E
[
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
+
1
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
.
Clearly, by interchanging the roles of X and Y in the preceding lemma, we obtain the convergence of
the expected costs E[CTN (ηN |ξN )]. Motivated by this lemma, we can now state the following definition.
Definition 4.3. Given initial asset positions x, y ∈ R and T > 0, the liquidation costs of X ∈ X (x, [0, T ])
given Y ∈X (y, [0, T ]) are defined as
C (X|Y ) = 1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
+
1
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2.
We can now define the concept of a Nash equilibrium in this continuous-time setting.
Definition 4.4. For a given time horizon [0, T ] and initial asset positions x, y ∈ R, a Nash equilibrium is
a pair (X∗, Y ∗) of strategies in X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) such that
E[C (X∗|Y ∗) ] = inf
X∈X (x,[0,T ])
E[C (X|Y ∗) ] and E[C (Y ∗|X∗) ] = inf
Y ∈X (y,[0,T ])
E[C (Y |X∗) ].
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4.2 Existence and nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium
The following result gives a complete solution to the questions of existence, uniqueness, and characterization
of Nash equilibria in continuous time. It states in particular that a Nash equilibrium exists for all initial
positions x, y ∈ R if and only θ is equal to the critical value θ∗ = 1/4; in this case, the Nash equilibrium is
unique and given by the continuous-time limits of equilibrium strategies derived in Theorem 3.1 for θ > 0.
Theorem 4.5. Let ρ > 0, T > 0, and x, y ∈ R be given.
(a) For θ = θ∗ = 1/4, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (X∗, Y ∗) in the class X (x, [0, T ]) ×
X (y, [0, T ]) of adapted strategies. The optimal strategies X∗ and Y ∗ are deterministic and given
by
X∗t =
1
2
(x+ y)Vt +
1
2
(x− y)Wt and Y ∗t =
1
2
(x+ y)Vt − 1
2
(x− y)Wt, (5)
where
Vt =
e3ρT
(
6ρ(T − t) + 4)− 4e3ρt
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1 if t ∈ [0, T ], and V0− = 1,
Wt =
ρ(T − t) + 1
ρT + 1
if t ∈ [0, T ), W0− = 1, and WT = 0.
(b) For θ 6= θ∗, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if x = y = 0, in which case the Nash equilibrium is
unique and the equilibrium strategies vanish identically.
A natural question in view of Theorem 4.5 (a) is whether the convergence of the discrete-time expected
costs, as observed in Theorem 3.2 for θ > 0, can be interpreted as the convergence toward the costs of the
continuous-time equilibrium. The following corollary answers this question in the affirmative.
Corollary 4.6. For x, y ∈ R, let X∗ and Y ∗ be as in (5) and assume that θ = θ∗ = 1/4. Then C (X∗|Y ∗)
is equal to the limit of the discrete-time expected costs in Theorem 3.2 (a).
4.3 Uniqueness and first-order conditions
In this section, we analyze Nash equilibria in continuous time. In particular, we will prove the uniqueness
of Nash equilibria, show that Nash equilibria in the class of deterministic strategies are also Nash equilibria
in the larger class of adapted strategies, and provide a first-order condition for optimal strategies in a Nash
equilibrium extending the Fredholm integral equations derived in [18]. For admissible strategies X and Y ,
we define the following expressions,
C(X,Y ) := E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dYs dXt
]
,
C1(X,Y ) := E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
]
, C2(X,Y ) := E
[ ∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt
]
.
Then,
E
[
C (X|Y )] = 1
2
C(X,X) + C1(X,Y ) +
1
2
C2(X,Y ) + θC2(X,X). (6)
A first step toward proving the uniqueness of Nash equilibria is the strict convexity of the map X 7→
E[C (X|Y )], which is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. Given T > 0, ρ > 0, θ ≥ 0, initial asset positions x, y ∈ R and an admissible strategy
Y ∈X (y, [0, T ]), the functional E[C (X|Y )] is strictly convex with respect to X ∈X (x, [0, T ]).
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Proof. Let α ∈ (0, 1) and X0, X1 ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) be two distinct admissible strategies. Since the function
t 7→ e−ρt is positive definite in the sense of Bochner, we obtain
C(X1 −X0, X1 −X0) = E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|s−t| d
(
X1s −X0s
)
d
(
X1t −X0t
)]
> 0; (7)
see [18, Proposition 2.6]. Hence,
C(αX1 + (1− α)X0, αX1 + (1− α)X0)
< C(αX1 + (1− α)X0, αX1 + (1− α)X0) + α(1− α)C(X1 −X0, X1 −X0)
= α2C(X1, X1) + (1− α)2C(X0, X0) + 2α(1− α)C(X0, X1)
+ α(1− α)C(X1, X1)− 2α(1− α)C(X0, X1) + α(1− α)C(X0, X0)
= αC(X1, X1) + (1− α)C(X0, X0).
Moreover, C1(X,Y ) and C2(X,Y ) are clearly affine in X, whereas C2(X,X) is convex. The result thus
follows from (6).
We can now establish the uniqueness of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 4.8. Given T > 0, ρ > 0, θ ≥ 0 and initial asset positions x, y ∈ R, there exists at most one
Nash equilibrium in the class X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) of adapted strategies.
Proof. We use a similar reasoning as in [28, Lemma 3.3] and [29, Lemma 4.1]. We assume by way of contra-
diction that there exist two distinct Nash equilibria (X0, Y 0) and (X1, Y 1) in X (x, [0, T ]) ×X (y, [0, T ]).
Then we define for α ∈ [0, 1]
Xα := αX1 + (1− α)X0 and Y α := αY 1 + (1− α)Y 0.
We furthermore let
f(α) := E
[
C (Xα|Y 0) + C (Y α|X0) + C (X1−α|Y 1) + C (Y 1−α|X1)
]
.
According to Lemma 4.7 and the assumption that the two Nash equilibria (X0, Y 0) and (X1, Y 1) are distinct,
f(α) is strictly convex in α and thus has a unique minimum at α = 0. It follows that
lim
h↓0
f(h)− f(0)
h
=
df(α)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
≥ 0. (8)
On the other hand, we have
d
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
E[C (Xα|Y 0)] = C(X1 −X0, X0) + C1(X1 −X0, Y 0)
+
1
2
C2(X
1 −X0, Y 0) + 2θC2(X1 −X0, X0).
Taking derivatives of E[C (Y α|X0)], E[C (X1−α|Y 1)] and E[C (Y 1−α|X1)] in the same way gives
df(α)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
= −C(X1 −X0, X1 −X0)− C(Y 1 − Y 0, Y 1 − Y 0)− C(Y 1 − Y 0, Y 1 − Y 0)
− 2θ
(
C2(X
1 −X0, X1 −X0) + C2(Y 1 − Y 0, Y 1 − Y 0)
)
< −1
2
C(X1 −X0, X1 −X0)− 1
2
C(Y 1 − Y 0, Y 1 − Y 0)− 1
2
C(X1 −X0, Y 1 − Y 0)
< 0,
which contradicts (8).
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The following lemma will allow us to concentrate on deterministic strategies when searching for a Nash
equilibrium. It is similar to [28, Lemma 3.4].
Lemma 4.9. A Nash equilibrium in the class Xdet(x, [0, T ]) ×Xdet(y, [0, T ]) of deterministic strategies is
also a Nash equilibrium in the class X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) of adapted strategies.
Proof. Let (X∗, Y ∗) ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) ×Xdet(y, [0, T ]) be a Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic
strategies. For any strategy X ∈X (x, [0, T ]), we have
C (X(ω)|Y ∗) ≥ C (X∗|Y ∗) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Therefore we obtain E[C (X|Y ∗)] ≥ C (X∗|Y ∗) with equality if and only if C (X|Y ∗) = C (X∗|Y ∗) P-a.s.
This shows the optimality of X∗ within the class X (x, [0, T ]) of adaptive strategies. Analogously we obtain
the optimality of Y ∗ within the class X (y, [0, T ]) of adaptive strategies. This completes the proof.
We now derive first-order conditions for the optimality of E[C (X|Y )] within the class X (x, [0, T ]) and
for given Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]). The first result is the following proposition, which, for our special case of
exponential decay of price impact, extends [18, Theorem 2.11], where, for Y = 0 and θ = 0, the optimality
of X ∈Xdet(x, [0, T ]) is characterized in terms of a Fredholm integral equation.
Proposition 4.10. Let x, y ∈ R and Y ∈ Xdet(y, T ) be given. Then a strategy X∗ ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) minimizes
the liquidation costs C (X|Y ) over X ∈Xdet(x, [0, T ]), if and only if there exists a constant η ∈ R such that
for all t ∈ [0, T ], ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs +
1
2
∆Yt + 2θ∆X
∗
t = η. (9)
Proof. Suppose first that X∗ minimizes the liquidation costs C (X|Y ) over X ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]). We fix
t0, t ∈ [0, T ] and define Z ∈ Xdet(0, [0, T ]) by Zs = 1{s≥t0} − 1{s≥t}. Admissible strategies Z with initial
value Z0− = 0 are often called “round trips”. The optimality of X∗ implies that the function
f(α) := C (X∗ + αZ|Y )
=
1
2
C(X∗, X∗) + C1(X∗, Y ) +
1
2
C2(X
∗, Y ) +
α2
2
C(Z,Z) + θC2(X
∗, X∗)
+ αC(Z,X∗) + αC1(Z, Y ) +
α
2
C2(Z, Y ) + 2αθC2(Z,X
∗) + α2θC2(Z,Z)
(10)
has a minimum at α = 0. Here we have used the decomposition (6). Thus,
0 =
df(α)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
= C(Z,X∗) + C1(Z, Y ) +
1
2
C2(Z, Y ) + 2θC2(Z,X
∗)
=
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t0−s| dX∗s −
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,t0)
e−ρ(t0−s) dYs −
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs
+
1
2
∆Yt0 −
1
2
∆Yt + 2θ∆X
∗
t0 − 2θ∆X∗t .
Thus, (9) follows if we let
η :=
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t0−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,t0)
e−ρ(t0−s) dYs +
1
2
∆Yt0 + 2θ∆X
∗
t0 .
Conversely, we now assume that X∗ ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) satisfies (9) and prove that X∗ is optimal. To
this end, we take an arbitrary “round trip” Z ∈ Xdet(0, [0, T ]). Using (10) for α = 1 and the facts that
C2(Z,Z) ≥ 0 and C(Z,Z) ≥ 0 by (7), we have
C (X∗ + Z|Y )
≥ C (X∗|Y ) + C(Z,X∗) + C1(Z, Y ) + 1
2
C2(Z, Y ) + 2θC2(Z,X
∗)
= C (X∗|Y ) +
∫
[0,T ]
(∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dXt +
∫
[0,s)
e−ρ|t−s| dYt +
1
2
∆Ys + 2θ∆X
∗
s
)
dZs
= C (X∗|Y ) + η(ZT − Z0) = C (X∗|Y ).
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Since every strategy X ∈Xdet(x, [0, T ]) can be written as X∗+Z for some “round trip” Z ∈Xdet(0, [0, T ]),
we obtain the optimality of X∗.
The following proposition extends the necessity of the first-order condition for optimality to the case of
strategies that are not necessarily deterministic.
Proposition 4.11. Let Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]) be given. If there exists an optimal strategy X∗ minimizing the
expected liquidation costs E[C (X|Y )] in X (x, [0, T ]), then for any [0, T ]-valued stopping time τ , there exists
an Fτ -measurable random variable η such that for every stopping time σ taking values in [τ, T ],
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|σ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
e−ρ(σ−t) dYt +
1
2
∆Yσ + 2θ∆X
∗
σ
∣∣∣Fτ] = η P-a.s. (11)
As a matter of fact, we can take
η := E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|τ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,τ)
e−ρ(τ−t) dYt +
1
2
∆Yτ + 2θ∆X
∗
τ
∣∣∣Fτ]
Proof. For τ and σ as in the assertion and A ∈ Fτ , we define a “round trip” Z ∈X (0, [0, T ]) by
Zt = 1A
(
1{t≥τ} − 1{t≥σ}
)
.
Expanding the expected costs E[C (X∗+αZ|Y )] as in (10) and taking derivatives with respect to α at α = 0
yields the following necessary first-order condition for optimality,
0 = C(Z,X∗) + C1(Z, Y ) +
1
2
C2(Z, Y ) + 2θC2(Z,X
∗). (12)
By exploiting the specific form of Z, (12) becomes
0 =E
[
1A
(∫
[0,T ]
(
e−ρ|τ−t| − e−ρ|σ−t|
)
dX∗t +
∫
[0,τ)
e−ρ|τ−t| dYt −
∫
[0,σ)
e−ρ|σ−t| dYt
+
1
2
(∆Yτ −∆Yσ) + 2θ
(
∆X∗τ −∆X∗σ
) )]
.
This implies that for all A ∈ Fτ ,
E
[
1A
(∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|σ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
e−ρ(σ−t) dYt +
1
2
∆Yσ + 2θ∆X
∗
σ
)]
= E
[
1A
(∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|τ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,τ)
e−ρ(τ−t) dYt +
1
2
∆Yτ + 2θ∆X
∗
τ
)]
.
Note that the right-hand side is independent of σ. Taking conditional expectations thus gives the result.
5 Expressing the discrete equilibrium strategies in closed form
In this section, our aim is to compute the vectors ν and ω. Our corresponding result will be Theorem 5.4
at the end of this section. It will be needed for the proofs of our asymptotic results.
As in [28], it will be convenient to define
α := e−ρT/N and κ := 2θ +
1
2
.
Note that we have κ ≥ 1/2 with equality if and only if θ = 0 and that the critical value θ∗ corresponds to
κ = 1.
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To compute ν, we define the matrix
B := (1− α2 )
(
Id +Γ−1( Γ˜ + 2θ Id)
)
.
To obtain a more explicit representation of B, recall first that the inverse of the Kac–Murdock–Szego˝ matrix
Γ has a simple tridiagonal structure and is given by
Γ−1 =
1
1− α2

1 −α 0 · · · · · · 0
−α 1 + α2 −α 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . −α 1 + α2 −α
0 · · · · · · 0 −α 1

; (13)
see, e.g., [20, Section 7.2, Problems 12-13]. Thus,
B = (1− α2) Id +

1 −α 0 · · · · · · 0
−α 1 + α2 −α 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . −α 1 + α2 −α
0 · · · · · · 0 −α 1


κ 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
α κ 0 · · · · · · 0
α2 α
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
... 0
...
αN−1 αN−2
. . .
. . . κ 0
αN αN−1 · · · · · · α κ

=

1− 2α2 + κ −ακ 0 · · · · · · 0
−α(κ− 1) 1 + α2(κ− 2) + κ −ακ 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . 0 −α(κ− 1) 1 + α2(κ− 2) + κ −ακ
0 · · · · · · 0 −α(κ− 1) 1− α2 + κ

.
Lemma 5.1. For k ≤ N , the kth leading principal minor δk of B is given by
δk = c+m
k
+ + c−m
k
−,
where, for the real number
R :=
√
α4 (κ− 2)2 − 2α2 (2 + (κ− 1)κ)+ (κ+ 1)2,
the real numbers c± and m± are given by
c± =
± (1− α2 (κ+ 2) + κ)+R
2R
and m± =
1 + α2 (κ− 2) + κ±R
2
.
Proof. We have
δ1 = 1− 2α2 + κ, (14)
δ2 = −2α4 (κ− 2)− 2α2 (κ+ 2) + (κ+ 1)2 . (15)
For k ∈ {3, . . . , N}, the kth principal minor, δk, is given by the recursion
δk =
(
1 + α2 (κ− 2) + κ
)
δk−1 − α2κ (κ− 1) δk−2.
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This recursion is a homogeneous linear difference equation of second order. Its characteristic equation is
m2 −
(
1 + α2 (κ− 2) + κ
)
m+ α2κ (κ− 1) = 0. (16)
This equation has the two roots, m+ and m−.
We claim first that m+ and m− are real for α ∈ [0, 1] and κ ≥ 1/2. This claim is equivalent to the
nonnegativity of the argument of the square root in our formula for R. We claim that this is in turn
equivalent to f (t) := t2 (κ− 2)2 − 2t (2 + (κ− 1)κ) + (κ+ 1)2 ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, where we have replaced
α2 by the parameter t. The preceding claim is clearly true for κ = 2. Otherwise, f is minimized at
t0 :=
(
2 + (κ− 1)κ) / (κ− 2)2. We have t0 < 1 if and only if κ < 2/3. In this case, we have f (t) ≥ f (t0) =
8 (1− κ)κ/ (κ− 2)2 > 0 for all t. For κ ≥ 2/3 we have t0 ≥ 1 and in turn f ′ (t) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. This
gives us f (t) ≥ f (1) = 1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and proves our claim that the roots m± are real.
It now follows from the general theory of homogeneous linear difference equations of second order that
every solution to (16) is of the form c1 (m+)
k+c2 (m−)k, where c1 and c2 are real constants; see [21, Theorem
3.7]. Requiring the two initial conditions (14) and (15) yields c1 = c+ and c2 = c−.
Lemma 5.2. Define φn recursively by
φN+2 = 1, φN+1 = 1− α2 + κ,
and for k = N,N − 1, . . . , 2 by
φk =
(
1 + α2 (κ− 2) + κ
)
φk+1 − α2κ (κ− 1) φk+2.
Then, for k ∈ {2, . . . , N + 2} ,
φk = d+m
N+2−k
+ + d−m
N+2−k
− ,
where m± are as in Lemma 5.1 and
d± :=
±
(
1 +
(
1− α2)κ)+R
2R
.
Proof. Let
ψ0 = 1, ψ1 = 1− α2 + κ, (17)
and for l ∈ {2, . . . , N}, let
ψl =
(
1 + α2 (κ− 2) + κ
)
ψl−1 − α2κ (κ− 1)ψl−2. (18)
Then ψk = φN+2−k. As in the proof of Lemma 5.1 we see that the general solution to (18) is of the form
d1m
l
+ + d2m
l−, where m± are as above. Choosing d1 = d+ and d2 = d− ensures that the initial conditions
(17) are satisfied and completes the proof
Lemma 5.3. The matrix B is non-singular and its inverse is given by
(B−1)ij =
{
(ακ)j−iδi−1φj+1δ−1N+1 if i ≤ j,
(α(κ− 1))i−jδj−1φi+1δ−1N+1 if i ≥ j,
(19)
where δ0 = 1.
Proof. It was shown in [28, Lemma 3.2] that both Γ and Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id are invertible. Thus, B =
(1− α2 ) Γ−1(Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id) is also invertible. Note that this implies δN+1 6= 0, so that the right-hand
side of (19) is well-defined. In view of Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, the explicit form of the inverse now follows from
Usmani’s formula for the inversion of a tridiagonal Jacobi matrix [33, 32].
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Theorem 5.4. The components of ω are given by
ωi =
(1− α)κ+ α
(
α(κ−1)
κ
)N+1−i
κ
(
κ− α (κ− 1)) , (20)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1}. In particular, ωN+1 = 1/κ.
The components of ν are given as follows,
ν1 =
1− α
δN+1
(
φ2 + (1− α)
N∑
j=2
(ακ)j−1 φj+1 + (ακ)N
)
,
νN+1 =
1− α
δN+1
((
α (κ− 1))N + (1− α) N∑
j=2
(
α (κ− 1))N+1−j δj−1 + δN),
and for i = 2, . . . , N ,
νi =
1− α
δN+1
((
α (κ− 1))i−1 φi+1 + (1− α) i−1∑
j=2
(
α (κ− 1))i−j δj−1φi+1
+ (1− α)
N∑
j=i
(ακ)j−i δi−1φj+1 + (ακ)N+1−i δi−1
)
.
Proof. The representation (20) was proved in [28, Eq. (16)] (note that our vector ω is denoted by u in [28],
that our α corresponds to a1/N in [28], and that λ = 1 here).
To prove the formulas for ν, note that we have (Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id)−11 = (1− α2)B−1Γ−11. The result thus
follows from Lemma 5.3 together with the fact that (1− α2)Γ−11 = (1, 1− α, . . . , 1− α, 1)>, which in turn
follows from (13).
6 Conclusion
We have studied the high-frequency limits of strategies and costs in a Nash equilibrium for two agents that
are competing to minimize liquidation costs in a discrete-time market impact model with exponentially
decaying price impact and quadratic transaction costs of size θ ≥ 0. Our results have permitted us to give
mathematically rigorous proofs of numerical observations made in [28]. In particular, we have shown that,
for θ = 0, equilibrium strategies and costs will oscillate indefinitely between two accumulation points, which
were computed explicitly. For θ > 0, strategies, costs, and total tax revenues were shown to converge toward
limits that are independent of θ. We have considered Nash equilibria in continuous time and shown that
for θ > 0 the limiting strategies converge to the unique continuous-time Nash equilibrium for the critical
value θ∗ and that the high-frequency limits of the discrete-time equilibrium costs converge to the expected
costs in the continuous-time Nash equilibrium. For θ 6= θ∗, however, it was shown that continuous-time
Nash equilibria do not exist unless both inventories are zero. Moreover, we have provided a range of model
parameters for which the limiting expected costs of both agents are decreasing functions of θ so that raising
additional transaction costs can reduce the expected costs of all agents.
A Proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 and Corollaries 3.3 and 3.5
Quantities such as α, ν, or ω introduced in Section 5 depend on the parameter N of the trading frequency.
For the proofs of our asymptotic results, we need to send N to infinity, but for the sake of reducing formula
length, we will not always make the N -dependence of quantities explicit. For instance, we will write
lim
N↑∞
α = lim
N↑∞
e−ρT/N = 0.
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first prove parts (c) and (d) of Theorem 3.1. The proofs of these parts are relatively easy.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (c). Let θ > 0, which is equivalent to κ > 1/2. We first sum over (20) to obtain that,
for all κ ≥ 1/2 and n = 1, . . . , N + 1,
n∑
k=1
ωk =
1
κ
[
n
(
1− α
(1− α)κ+ α
)
+
α
(1− α)κ+ α
(α(κ− 1)
κ
)N+1−n (α(κ−1)
κ
)n − 1
α(κ−1)
κ − 1
]
; (21)
Here we explicitly include the case κ = 1/2 for later use. By taking n = N + 1, formula (21) gives
ω>1 =
1
κ
[
(N + 1)
(
1− α
(1− α)κ+ α
)
+
α
(1− α)κ+ α
(α(κ−1)
κ
)N+1 − 1
α(κ−1)
κ − 1
]
.
Recalling that α = e−ρT/N , we have that
lim
N↑∞
(N + 1)
(
1− α
(1− α)κ+ α
)
= κρT. (22)
Since for κ > 1/2 we have |κ− 1|/κ < 1, this gives
lim
N↑∞
ω>1 = ρT + 1. (23)
Now, with nt := dNt/T e,
W
(N)
t = 1−
1
ω>1
nt∑
k=1
ωk.
Since for t < T we have (α(κ−1)κ )
N+1−nt → 0 as N ↑ ∞, formula (21) gives in this case that
nt∑
k=1
ωk −→ ρt as N ↑ ∞.
Putting everything together now yields the assertion.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (d). For κ = 1/2, the formula (21) simplifies as follows,
n∑
k=1
ωk = 2
[
n
(
1− 2α
1 + α
)
+ (−1)N+1 2α
N+2−n((−1)n − αn)
(1 + α)2
]
. (24)
Thus, for κ = 1/2, we get with (22) that
lim
N↑∞
N even
ω>1 = lim
N↑∞
N even
N+1∑
i=1
ωi = e
−ρT + ρT + 1 and lim
N↑∞
N odd
ω>1 = −e−ρT + ρT + 1. (25)
If taking n = nt = dNt/T e, one easily shows that as N ↑ ∞,
n
(
1− 2α
1 + α
)
−→ ρt
2
and
2αN+2−n
(± 1− αn)
(1 + α)2
−→ e−ρ(T−t)(±1− e−ρt).
Plugging this into (24) and using the definition of W (N) yields the result of Theorem 3.1 (d) after a short
computation.
Now we prepare for the proofs of parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 3.1. We first consider the case κ = 1; the
corresponding proof of Theorem 3.1 (a) will be given after the following lemma.
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Lemma A.1. Let κ = 1. Then
n∑
i=1
νi =
1
2 + α
(
(1− α)n+ α+ α
(
α2 − 2)
2 (2 + α)
(
α
2− α2
)N+1
+
α (1 + α)
2 + α
(
α
2− α2
)N+1−n)
(26)
for n ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1}.
Proof. Plugging in κ = 1 yields that δk = 2
(
1− α2) (2− α2)k−1 for k ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1}, as well as φk =(
2− α2)N+2−k for k ∈ {2, . . . , N + 1}. Therefore,
ν1 =
1
2 + α
(
1 +
2− α2
2
(
α
2− α2
)N+1)
and νi =
1
2 + α
(
1− α+
(
1− α2
)( α
2− α2
)N+2−i)
for i ∈ {2, . . . , N + 1}. Summing over i = 1, . . . , n yields the result.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (a) for κ = 1. Recall that α = e−ρT/N . Therefore, (1− α)nt → ρt and
(
2− α2)nt →
e2ρt for all t ∈ (0, T ]. Taking limits in (26) yields
nt∑
i=1
νi −→
e−3ρT
(
4e3ρt − 1)+ 6 (ρt+ 1)
18
. (27)
Plugging this into the definition of V
(N)
t yields the result.
Now we prepare for the proof of parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 3.1 in case κ 6= 1. For the remainder of
this paper, we define the shorthand notation for x ∈ R and m ∈ N,
[x]m :=
1− α
δN+1
xm.
This notation will be convenient when computing limits of expressions like [x]N .
Lemma A.2. Let κ ≥ 1/2 and κ 6= 1. Define C1 := α (1 + α) /
(
κ+ 1− α (κ− 2)). Then
n∑
i=1
νi =
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσ
(
mσ − α2κ
)
mσ − ακ [mσ]
N (28)
+ (1− α) (n− 1)
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσdσ
(
α (κ− 1)
mσ − α (κ− 1) +
mσ
mσ − ακ
)
[mσ]
N
+ C1
1 + ∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσmσ
((
mσ
ακ
)n−1 − 1)
mσ − ακ
αN [κ]N
+ 2C1
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ
(
α(κ−1)
mσ
−
(
α(κ−1)
mσ
)n)
mσ − α (κ− 1) [mσ]
N ,
for n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and
νN+1 =
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσ
(
mσ − α2 (κ− 1)
)
mσ − α (κ− 1) [mσ]
N + 2C1α
N [κ− 1]N . (29)
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Proof. For i ∈ {3, . . . , N},
i−1∑
j=2
(
α (κ− 1))i−j δj−1φi+1 (30)
= α (κ− 1)
( ∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσdσ
mσ − α (κ− 1) (mσ)
N
+
c+d− (m−)N+1
m+
(
m+ − α (κ− 1)
) (m+
m−
)i
+
c−d+ (m+)N+1
m−
(
m− − α (κ− 1)
) (m−
m+
)i
−
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσmσ
mσ − α (κ− 1)
∑
τ∈{+,−}
dτ (mτ )
N+1(
α (κ− 1))2
(
α (κ− 1)
mτ
)i)
and
N∑
j=i
(ακ)j−i δi−1φj+1 (31)
=
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσdσ
mσ − ακ (mσ)
N+1 +
c+d− (m−)N+2
m+ (m− − ακ)
(
m+
m−
)i
+
c−d+ (m+)N+2
m− (m+ − ακ)
(
m−
m+
)i
−
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ
mσ − ακ
∑
τ∈{+,−}
cτ (ακ)
N+1
mτ
(
mτ
ακ
)i
.
Since
α (κ− 1) (m− − ακ) +m−
(
m+ − α (κ− 1)
)
= α (κ− 1) (m+ − ακ) +m+
(
m− − α (κ− 1)
)
= m+m− − α2κ (κ− 1) = 0,
the second and third summands in (30) and (31) cancel each other out. Simplifying further, we arrive at
νi = (1− α)
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσdσ
(
α (κ− 1)
mσ − α (κ− 1) +
mσ
mσ − ακ
)
[mσ]
N
+ 2C1
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ [mσ]
N
α (κ− 1)
(
α (κ− 1)
mσ
)i
+ C1
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσα
N+1κ [κ]N
mσ
(
mσ
ακ
)i
,
for i ∈ {2, . . . , N}. Similar calculations yield
ν1 =
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσ
(
mσ − α2κ
)
mσ − ακ [mσ]
N + C1α
N [κ]N ,
νN+1 =
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσ
(
mσ − α2 (κ− 1)
)
mσ − α (κ− 1) [mσ]
N + 2C1α
N [κ− 1]N .
Noting that
n∑
i=2
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ [mσ]
N
α (κ− 1)
(
α (κ− 1)
mσ
)i
=
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ
((
mσ
α(κ−1)
)N−1 − ( mσα(κ−1))N−n)
mσ − α (κ− 1) α
N [κ]N
and
n∑
i=2
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσα
N+1κ [κ]N
mσ
(
mσ
ακ
)i
=
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσmσ
((
mσ
ακ
)n−1 − 1)
mσ − ακ α
N [κ]N
for all n ∈ {2, . . . , N} completes the proof.
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The following lemma summarizes the limit behaviour of all objects that we will encounter while obtaining
the limiting strategy and, later, the limiting costs. Recall that nt := dNt/T e. For a sequence of real
numbers (aN )N∈N and a real number a, we use the shorthand notation (aN )
nt → ±a to state that (aN )nt =
(−1)nt |aN |nt and limN→∞ |aN |nt = a.
Lemma A.3. For κ ≥ 1/2 and κ 6= 1, we have the following limits for N ↑ ∞.
(a) α→ 1 and αnt → e−ρt;
(b) R→ 1, c+ → 0, c− → 1, d+ → 1, d− → 0, m+ → κ, and m− → κ− 1;
(c) c+m+−κ → 2,
c+
m+−ακ → 43 ,
c+
m+−α2κ → 1, and
c+
1−α2 → 2κ;
(d) d−m−−(κ−1) → −12 ,
d−
m−−α(κ−1) → −23 ,
d−
m−−α2(κ−1) → −1, and
d−
1−α2 → κ− 1;
(e) (1− α)nt → ρt.
If additionally κ > 1/2, then also the following limits are true.
(f)
(
κ−1
κ
)nt → 0, (m+κ )nt → e2ρt, (κ−1m+ )nt → 0, (m−κ )nt → 0, and (κ−1m− )nt → e4ρt;
(g) [m+]
N → 14κ , [m−]N → 0, [κ]N → e
−2ρT
4κ , and [κ− 1]N → 0;
(h)
((κ−1)/κ)N
1−α2 → 0, [m−]
N
1−α2 → 0, and [κ−1]
N
1−α2 → 0.
If, on the other hand, κ = 1/2 then the preceding limits no longer hold. Instead, we have the following.
(f’)
(
κ−1
κ
)nt → ±1, (m+κ )nt → e2ρt, (κ−1m+ )nt → ±e−2ρt, (m−κ )nt → ±e−4ρt, and (κ−1m− )nt → e4ρt;
(g’) [m+]
2N → 1
e−6ρT+2 , [m−]
2N → 1
2e6ρT+1
, [κ]2N → e4ρT
2e6ρT+1
, [κ− 1]2N → e4ρT
2e6ρT+1
,
[m+]
2N+1 → 1−e−6ρT+2 , [m−]2N+1 → 1−2e6ρT+1 , [κ]2N+1 → e
4ρT
2e6ρT−1 , and [κ− 1]2N+1 → e
4ρT
−2e6ρT+1 ;
(h’) m++κ−1m++α(κ−1) → 23 ,
m−+α2κ
m−+ακ → 23 , and
κ+α(κ−1)
1−α2 → 14 .
Proof. (a) and (b) are obvious, (c)–(e) follow by applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule. The first statement in (f) follows
from the fact that κ > 1/2. To prove the second, write(
m+/κ
)N
= exp
(
N log
(
m+/κ
))
and apply L’Hoˆpital’s rule. The third statement follows directly, since(
(κ− 1) /κ)nt = (m+/κ)nt ((κ− 1) /m+)nt → 0.
The fourth and fifth statements can be proved in a similar fashion. With regard to (g) and (h), recall that
1− α
δN+1
=
c+
(
1− α2 + κ− α2κ(κ−1)m+
)
1− α (m+)
N +
c−
((
1− α2 + κ)m− − α2κ (κ− 1))
m− (1− α) (m−)
N

−1
.
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Applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule:
c+
(
1− α2 + κ− α2κ(κ−1)m+
)
1− α → 4κ, and
c−
((
1− α2 + κ)m− − α2κ (κ− 1))
m− (1− α) → −2 (κ− 1)
2 .
It follows from (vi) that
(
m−/m+
)N → 0 and, using L’Hoˆpital’s rule again,(
m−/m+
)N
1− α2 → 0,
(
m−/ (κ− 1)
)N
1− α2 → 0, and
(
(κ− 1) /κ)N
1− α2 → 0.
Plugging in and taking limits yields the results.
If κ = 1/2, observe that
m− =
3
4
(
1− α2 −
√(
1− α2)2 + 4/9α2) < 0 < m+.
With this in mind, statements (f’) and (g’) can be proved in the same way as statements (f) and (g). (h’)
is another application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (a) for κ 6= 1. Let κ > 1/2 and κ 6= 1. The limits of (28) and (29) are easily calculated
using Lemma A.3. In total, we see that, as N ↑ ∞,
nt∑
i=1
νi −→
e−3ρT
(
6e3ρT (ρt+ 1) + 4e3ρt − 1
)
18
, (32)
for t ∈ (0, T ), and
N+1∑
i=1
νi −→
e−3ρT
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1
)
18
. (33)
Note that (33) coincides with the value of the right-hand side of (32) for t = T and that (32) coincides with
the limit from (27), which was obtained for κ = 1. Plugging this result into the definition of V (N) yields the
result.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (b). For κ = 1/2, the limits of (28) and (29) can be obtained using Lemma A.3. We
find that
∑nt
i=1 νi has two cluster points for every t ∈ (0, T ]. One is approached if nt is even, the other one
if nt is odd. The same is true for
∑N+1
i=1 νi, depending on whether N is even or odd. For future reference,
we now state the limits of 1>ν as N ↑ ∞;
lim
N↑∞
N even
1>ν =
2e6ρT (3ρT + 5) + e3ρT + 3ρT + 7
18e6ρT + 9
,
lim
N↑∞
N odd
1>ν =
2e6ρT (3ρT + 5)− 3e3ρT − 3ρT − 7
18e6ρT − 9 .
(34)
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2 (a)
We start preparing the proof with the following simple lemma, which holds for all κ ≥ 1/2.
Lemma A.4. We have
E
[
CT
(
ξ | η)] = 1
8
(
(x+ y)2
1>ν
+
(
x2 − y2) (1>ν + 1>ω)(
1>ν
) (
1>ω
) + (x− y)2
1>ω
(35)
+
(
x+ y
1>ν
)2
ν>Γ˜ν +
x2 − y2(
1>ν
) (
1>ω
)ω> (Γ˜− Γ˜>)ν − (x− y
1>ω
)2
ω>Γ˜ω
)
.
Proof. We have
E
[
CT
(
ξ | η)] = 1
2
ξ> (Γ + 2θ Id) ξ + ξ>Γ˜η
=
1
2
((
x+ y
2
(
1>ν
))2(ν> (Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id)ν)
+
(x+ y) (x− y)
4
(
1>ν
) (
1>ω
) (ν> (Γ− Γ˜ + 2θ Id)ω + ω> (Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id)ν)
+
(
x− y
2
(
1>ω
))2(ω> (Γ− Γ˜ + 2θ Id)ω))+ 1
2
ξ>Γ˜η.
By definition, (Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id)ν = (Γ− Γ˜ + 2θ Id)ω = 1. Since also ν>1 = 1>ν, ω>1 = 1>ω, and
ν>Γ˜ω = ω>Γ˜>ν, representation (35) follows.
Lemma A.5. For κ > 1/2, as N ↑ ∞,
ν>Γ˜ν −→ (−e−6ρT − 8e−3ρT + 24ρT + 36)/216,
ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν −→ (−e−3ρT + 4)/6, and
ω>Γ˜ω −→ (2ρT + 1) /2.
Proof. First let κ = 1. Then
ν>Γ˜ν =
(ν1)
2
2
+
1
2
N+1∑
i=2
(νi)
2 + ν1
N+1∑
i=2
νiα
i−1 +
N+1∑
i=3
i−1∑
j=2
νiνjα
i−j
=
1
(2 + α)2
((
1− α2)N
2
+
−α4 + 2α2 + 4α+ 4
2
(
4− α2)
− α
2 (α+ 1)
2 (α+ 2)
(
α
2− α2
)N
− α
4
8
(
4− α2)
(
α
2− α2
)2N )
→ −e
−6ρT − 8e−3ρT + 24ρT + 36
216
,
as well as
ω>
(
Γ˜− Γ˜>
)
ν = ν1
N+1∑
i=2
ωiα
i−1 + ωN+1
N∑
i=2
νiα
N+1−i +
N∑
i=1
ωi
 i−1∑
j=2
νjα
i−j −
N+1∑
j=i+1
νjα
j−i

= − α
2
(2− α2)(2 + α)
(
2− α2
2
(
α
2− α2
)N
+ α2 − 3
)
→ −3e
−3ρT + 4
6
,
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and
ω>Γ˜ω =
1
2
N∑
i=1
(1− α)2 + 1
2
+
N∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
(1− α)2 αi−j +
N∑
j=1
(1− α)αN+1−j
=
N
(
1− α2)+ 1
2
→ 2ρT + 1
2
.
Now let κ ≥ 1/2 and κ 6= 1. Note that we explicitly include the case κ = 1/2, because partial results we
will obtain in the following computations will also be needed to treat this case.
The following calculations are standard but tedious. We need to find the limits of ν>Γ˜ν, of ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν,
and of ω>Γ˜ω. We first compute Γ˜ν. Define C1 := α (1 + α) /
(
1− α (κ− 2) + κ) as above and
C2 :=
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσdσ
(
α (κ− 1)
mσ − α (κ− 1) +
mσ
mσ − ακ
)
[mσ]
N ,
C3 := −C2 +
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσ
(
mσ − α2κ
mσ − ακ +
2C1 (κ− 1)
mσ − (κ− 1)
)
[mσ]
N .
Also for σ ∈ {+,−}, let σ = − if σ = + and σ = + if σ = −.
( Γ˜ν )1 =
1
2
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσ
(
mσ − α2κ
)
mσ − ακ [mσ]
N +
C1α
N
2
[κ]N ,
( Γ˜ν )2 =
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσ
(
α
(
mσ − α2κ
)
mσ − ακ +
C1α (κ− 1)
mσ
)
[mσ]
N
+
C2 (1− α)
2
+
C1
(
1 + 2α2 (κ− 1) + κ)αN
2ακ
[κ]N ,
and for i ∈ {3, . . . , N} we have
(Γ˜ν )i =
C2 (1 + α)
2
+
C1
α (κ− 1)
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ (1− κ−mσ) [mσ]N
1− κ+mσ
(
(κ− 1)α
mσ
)i
+
C1α
N+1κ [κ]N
2
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσ
(
mσ + α
2κ
)
mσ
(
mσ − α2κ
) (mσ
ακ
)i
+ C3α
i−1.
Also,
( Γ˜ν )N+1 =
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσ
(
dσmσα
mσ − ακ +
mσ + (2dσ − 1)α2 (κ− 1)
2
(
mσ − α (κ− 1)
) + C1α2κ
mσ − α2κ
)
[mσ]
N
+ C3α
N − C1αNκ [κ− 1]N .
Next we compute νi(Γ˜ν)i for i ∈ {3, . . . , N}. It holds that
νi(Γ˜ν)i = D
i
1 +D
i
2 +D
i
3 +D
i
4
with Di1 := C2 (1 + α) νi/2,
Di2 := C2 (1− α)
(
C3α
i−1 +
C1
α (κ− 1)
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ (1− κ−mσ) [mσ]N
1− κ+mσ
(
α (κ− 1)
mσ
)i
+
C1α
N+1κ [κ]N
2
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσ
(
mσ + α
2κ
)
mσ
(
mσ − α2κ
) (mσ
ακ
)i)
,
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Di3 :=
C1C3
α
2 ∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ [mσ]
N
α (κ− 1)
(
α2 (κ− 1)
mσ
)i
+
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσα
N+1κ [κ]N
mσ
(
mσ
κ
)i ,
and
Di4 := (C1)
2
(
2(
α (κ− 1))2
( ∑
σ∈{+,−}
(
dσmσ [mσ]
N
)2 1− κ−mσ
1− κ+mσ
(
α (κ− 1)
mσ
)2i
+ d+d−m+m− [m+]N [m−]N
(κ− 1)2 −m+m−(
1− α2) (1− κ)
(α (κ− 1))2
m+m−
i)
+
α2(N+1)κ2([κ]N )2
2
( ∑
σ∈{+,−}
(cσ)
2 (mσ + α2κ)
(mσ)
2 (mσ − α2κ)
(
mσ
ακ
)2i
+
c+c−
((
α2κ
)2 −m+m−)
m+m−α2
(
1− α2)κ
(
m+m−
(ακ)2
)i)
+
αNκ [κ]N
κ− 1
(
1− (1− α2)κ
1− α2
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσdσ [mσ]
N
(
κ− 1
κ
)i
+
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσdσmσ [mσ]
N
mσ
(
1− κ−mσ
1− κ+mσ +
mσ + α
2κ
mσ − α2κ
)(
mσ (κ− 1)
mσκ
)i)
.
Summing over i, we find that
N∑
i=3
Di1 =
C2 (1 + α)
2
(
C2 (1− α) (N − 2) + C1
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσmσ
(
ακ
mσ
[mσ]
N − mσακ αN [κ]N
)
mσ − ακ
+ 2C1
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ
((
α(κ−1)
mσ
)2
[mσ]
N − αN [κ− 1]N
)
mσ − α (κ− 1)
)
Moreover,
N∑
i=3
Di2 = C2C3
(
α2 − αN
)
+
C1C2
(
1− α2)
1 + α
∑
σ∈{+,−}
(dσ)
2 (1− κ−mσ)
(
(mσ)
2 αN [κ− 1]N − (α (κ− 1))2 [mσ]N)
dσmσ
(
mσ − (κ− 1)
) (
α (κ− 1)−mσ
)
+
C1C2
(
1− α2)
2 (1 + α)
∑
σ∈{+,−}
(cσ)
2 (mσ + α2κ) ((ακ)2 [mσ]N − (mσ)2 αN [κ]N)
cσακ (mσ − ακ)
(
mσ − α2κ
) ,
N∑
i=3
Di3 = C1C3
( ∑
σ∈{+,−}
2dσ
(
(mσα
N )2 [κ− 1]N − αN (α (κ− 1))2 [mσ]N)
mσ
(
α2 (κ− 1)−mσ
)
+
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσ
(
αNκ2 [mσ]
N − (mσ)2 αN [κ]N
)
κ (mσ − κ)
)
,
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and
N∑
i=3
Di4 (36)
= (C1)
2
(
2
∑
σ∈{+,−}
(dσmσ)
2 (1− κ−mσ)(
mσ − (κ− 1)
) (
α (κ− 1)−mσ
) (
mσ + α (κ− 1)
) (αN [κ− 1]N)2
− 1
2 (ακ)2
∑
σ∈{+,−}
(cσ)
2 (mσ)
4 (mσ + α2κ)
(mσ − ακ)
(
mσ − α2κ
)
(mσ + ακ)
(
αN [κ]N
)2
+
∑
σ∈{+,−}
(
(cσ)
2 (mσ + α2κ) (ακ)2
2 (mσ − ακ)
(
mσ − α2κ
)
(mσ + ακ)
− 2 (dσ)
2 (α (κ− 1))4 (1− κ−mσ)
(mσ)
2 (mσ − (κ− 1)) (α (κ− 1)−mσ) (mσ + α (κ− 1))
)(
[mσ]
N
)2
+
∑
σ∈{+,−}
αNκ
cσdσmσ
(
1−κ−mσ
1−κ+mσ +
mσ+α2κ
mσ−α2κ
)
mσ (κ− 1)−mσκ −
cσdσ
(
1− (1− α2)κ)
1− α2
 [mσ]N [κ− 1]N
+
∑
σ∈{+,−}
αN (κ− 1)2
κ
cσdσ
(
1− (1− α2)κ)
1− α2 −
cσdσ (mσ)
2
(
1−κ−mσ
1−κ+mσ +
mσ+α
2κ
mσ−α2κ
)
mσ
(
mσ (κ− 1)−mσκ
)
 [mσ]N [κ]N
+ κ
((
α2 − 1
)
κ+ 1
)(
αN
)2c+c− (α (κ− 1))2
2 (ακ)2
(
1− α2)
(
[κ]N
)2 − 2d+d−
1− α2
(
[κ− 1]N
)2
+
(
1− α2)κ− 1
2κ
(
c+c−κ2
1− α2 −
4d+d− (κ− 1)2
1− α2
)
[m+]
N [m−]N
)
.
Note that
c+
m+ (κ− 1)−m−κ =
R( d−
1− α2
1− α2
c+
κ+ (κ− 1)
)−1 .
The limit of ν>Γ˜ν is a combination of the limits found in Lemma A.3. Thus,
ν>Γ˜ν = ν1( Γ˜ν )1 + ν2( Γ˜ν )2 +
4∑
k=1
N∑
i=3
Dik + νN+1( Γ˜ν )N+1
→
e−6ρT
(
2e3ρT + 1
)2
72κ2
+
e−6ρT
(
2e3ρT + 1
)2
(κ− 1) (3κ− 1)
72κ4
+
e−6ρT
216κ4
(
12e6ρT
(
κ4 (2ρT + 3)− 4κ2 + 4κ− 1
)
− 4e3ρT
(
2κ4 + 12κ2 − 12κ+ 3
)
− κ4 − 12κ2 + 12κ− 3
)
+ 0
=
−e−6ρT − 8e−3ρT + 24ρT + 36
216
.
Now we turn to the computation of ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν. Define
C4 :=
(
α2 (κ− 1)− κ)− α(α(κ−1)κ )N+1(
κ− α (κ− 1)) (α2 (κ− 1)− κ) and C5 := α2 (κ− 1)
(
κ+ α (κ− 1))
κ2
(
α2 (κ− 1)− κ) .
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We have
(ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> ))1 = α
κ− α (κ− 1)
(
1−
(
α (κ− 1)
κ
)N)
,
(ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> ))i =
(
α2 (κ− 1)− κ)− α(α(κ−1)κ )N+1(
κ− α (κ− 1)) (α2 (κ− 1)− κ) αi + α
(
κ+ α (κ− 1))
κ
(
α2 (κ− 1)− κ)
(
α (κ− 1)
κ
)N+1−i
,
for i ∈ {2, . . . , N}, and
(ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> ))N+1 =
α
(
αN
(
κ− α2 (κ− 1))κ+ α2 (κ− 1)(κ− 1 + (α2(κ−1)κ )N)− κ2)
κ
(
κ− α (κ− 1)) (κ− α2 (κ− 1)) .
For i ∈ {2, . . . , N}:
(ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν )i
= C2 (1− α)
(
C4α
i + C5
(
α (κ− 1)
κ
)N ( κ
α (κ− 1)
)i)
+ 2C1
∑
σ∈{+,−}
dσmσ
α (κ− 1)
C4(α2 (κ− 1)
mσ
)i
+ C5
(
α (κ− 1)
κ
)N ( κ
mσ
)i [mσ]N
+ C1
∑
σ∈{+,−}
cσα
N+1κ
mσ
(
C4
(
mσ
κ
)i
+ C5
(
α (κ− 1)
κ
)N ( mσ
α2 (κ− 1)
)i)
[κ]N .
Summing over i, we arrive at
N∑
i=2
(ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν )i (37)
= C2
C4 (α2 − αN+1)+ C5 (1− α) ακ (κ− 1)− αNκ2 ((κ− 1) /κ)N
α (κ− 1) (κ− α (κ− 1))

+ C1
∑
σ∈{+,−}
(
C4
(
2dσα
3 (κ− 1)
mσ − α2 (κ− 1) −
cσα
N+1κ
κ−mσ
)
+ C5
(
2dσα
Nκ2
(
(κ−1)
κ
)N
α (κ− 1) (mσ − κ) −
cσακ
α2 (κ− 1)−mσ
))
[mσ]
N
− C1ακ
C4αN (κ+ 1)κ + C5
(
1− 2α2) (α2(κ−1)κ )N
α2
(
1− α2) (κ− 1)
 [κ]N
− 2C1
C4α2N+1 + C5κ
(
1− (α2 − 1)κ)αN
α
(
1− α2) (κ− 1)
 [κ− 1]N .
Note that (
(κ− 1) /κ)N
κ−m+ =
(
(κ− 1) /κ)N
1− α2
1− α2
c+
c+
κ−m+ , and
[m−]N
m− − α (κ− 1) =
[m−]N
1− α2
1− α2
d−
d−
m− − α (κ− 1) .
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Again, Lemma A.3 gives us all the necessary limits; we find that
ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν = (ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> ))1ν1 +
N∑
i=2
(ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν )i + (ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> ))N+1νN+1
→ e
−3ρT + 2
6κ
+
2 (2κ− 1)− (κ+ 1) e−3ρT
6κ
+ 0 =
−e−3ρT + 4
6
.
Finally,
ω>Γ˜ω =
1
2
N∑
i=1
(ωi)
2 +
(ωN+1)
2
2
+
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ωiωjα
j−i + ωN+1
N∑
i=1
ωiα
N+1−i
=
κ2 − 2α (1− α2)κ (κ− 1)− α2 (2− α2) (κ− 1)2
2
(
κ− α (κ− 1))3 (κ+ α (κ− 1)) (38)
+
(1 + α) (1− α)N
2
(
κ− α (κ− 1))2 − α
N+2
(
1− (1− α)κ) (κ− 1) ((κ− 1) /κ)N
κ
(
κ− α (κ− 1))3
+
α2(N+2) (κ− 1)2 (2κ− 1) ((κ− 1) /κ)2N
2
(
κ− α (κ− 1))3 (κ+ α (κ− 1))κ2 .
For κ > 1/2, we find ω>Γ˜ω → (2ρT + 1) /2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 (a). It was shown in (23) that
1>ω =
N+1∑
i=1
ωi −→ ρT + 1 as N ↑ ∞. (39)
The limit of 1>ν =
∑N+1
i=1 νi was obtained in (27) and (33) for the respective cases κ = 1 and κ 6= 1,
κ > 1/2. The limits of ν>Γ˜ν,ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν, and ω>Γ˜ω can be found in Lemma A.5. Plugging these
results into (35) yields assertion (a).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2 (b)
Lemma A.6. Let κ = 1/2. It holds that
lim
N↑∞
N even
ν>Γ˜ν =
2e6ρT (3ρT + 5) + e3ρT + 3ρT + 7
54e6ρT + 27
,
lim
N↑∞
N even
ω>(Γ˜− Γ˜>)ν = 4e
6ρT − 6e5ρT + e3ρT − 3e−ρT + 4
6e6ρT + 3
,
lim
N↑∞
N even
ω>Γ˜ω = e−ρT + ρT + 1.
Moreover,
lim
N↑∞
N odd
ν>Γ˜ν =
2e6ρT (3ρT + 5)− 3e3ρT − 3ρT − 7
54e6ρT − 27 ,
lim
N↑∞
N odd
ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν = −4e
6ρT − 6e5ρT + 3e3ρT + 3e−ρT + 4
−6e6ρT + 3 , and
lim
N↑∞
N odd
ω>Γ˜ω = −e−ρT + ρT + 1.
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Proof. As explained in the proof of Lemma A.5, the representations of ν>Γ˜ν, ω>( Γ˜− Γ˜> )ν, and ω>Γ˜ω
obtained in the proof of that lemma for κ 6= 1 are also valid for κ = 1/2. In (36), note that for σ ∈ {+,−},
cσdσ (mσ)
2
(
1−κ−mσ
1−κ+mσ +
mσ+α
2κ
mσ−α2κ
)
mσ
(
mσ (κ− 1)−mσκ
) = 16 (mσ)2 α2
mσ
(
27α4 − 42α2 + 27) .
Also in (37),
C5
1− α2 =
α2 (κ− 1)
κ2
(
α2 (κ− 1)− κ) κ+ α (κ− 1)1− α2 ,
C5
m+ − κ =
C5
1− α2
1− α2
c+
c+
m+ − κ, and
C5
m− − α2 (κ− 1) =
C5
1− α2
1− α2
d−
d−
m− − α2 (κ− 1) .
Equation (38) simplifies to
−
2
(
α2
(
1− 2 (−1)N αN
)
− 2α− 1− (1 + α) (1− α)N
)
(1 + α)2
.
Plugging in the limits from Lemma A.3 completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 (b). To prove part (b) of Theorem 3.2, we now proceed just as in the proof of part
(a), this time using the limits obtained in (25), (34), and Lemma A.6.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3.3
Let x = y. For z > 0, define
c+0 (z) :=
(2x)2
(
6e6z + 3
)
2
(
2e6z (3z + 5) + e3z + 3z + 7
) ,
c−0 (z) :=
(2x)2
(
6e6z − 3)
2
(
2e6z (3z + 5)− 3e3z − 3z − 7) ,
c1/4 (z) :=
(2x)2
(
36e6z (8z + 13)− 60e3z − 3)
16
(
2e3z (3z + 5)− 1)2 .
By Theorem 3.2, these functions correspond to the limiting expected costs of trader X if ρT = z, trader X
has initial endowment x, trader Y has initial endowment y = x, and we have θ = 0 (for c±0 ) or θ > 0 (for
c1/4). Without loss of generality, we can take x = y = 1/2. We find that
6e6z + 3
2
(
2e6z (3z + 5) + e3z + 3z + 7
) − 6e6z − 3
2
(
2e6z (3z + 5)− 3e3z − 3z − 7)
= − 3e
3z(2e3z + 1)2
(2e6z(3z + 5) + e3z + 3z + 7)(2e6z(3z + 5)− 3e3z − 3z − 7) .
Rewriting the second factor in the denominator shows that the expression above is negative:
2e6z(3z + 5)− 3e3z − 3z − 7 = (ez − 1)(e2z + ez + 1)(10e3z + 7) + 3z(2e6z − 1) > 0.
This shows that c+0 < c
−
0 for all z > 0. It remains to show: If z > log(4 +
√
62/3)/3, then
6e6z + 3
2
(
2e6z (3z + 5) + e3z + 3z + 7
) > 36e6z (8z + 13)− 60e3z − 3
16
(
2e3z (3z + 5)− 1)2 .
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Multiplying by both denominators, we find that this is true if and only if
0 < 16
(
2e3z (3z + 5)− 1
)2 (
6e6z + 3
)
− 2
(
2e6z (3z + 5) + e3z + 3z + 7
)(
36e6z (8z + 13)− 60e3z − 3
)
A tedious rearrangement of terms shows that the expression on the right hand side equals
6
(
2e3z + 1
)2
(3z + 5)
(
2e6z − e3z 48z + 79
3z + 5
+
3z + 15
3z + 5
)
.
Since 48z + 79 < 16(3z + 5) and 3z + 15 > 3z + 5 for all r > 0, this expression is larger than
6
(
2e3z + 1
)2
(3z + 5)
(
2e6z − 16e3z + 1
)
.
The real-valued function a 7→ 2a2 − 16a+ 1 has the two roots a1 := 4−
√
62/2 and a2 := 4 +
√
62/2. Since
a1 < 1 < a2, the real-valued function b 7→ 2e6b − 16e3b + 1 has exactly one positive root log(a2)/3. Hence,
for every z > log(a2)/3 = log(4 +
√
62/2)/3 it holds that
0 < 6
(
2e3z + 1
)2
(3z + 5)
(
2e6z − 16e3z + 1
)
< 16
(
2e3z (3z + 5)− 1
)2 (
6e6z + 3
)
− 2
(
2e6z (3z + 5) + e3z + 3z + 7
)(
36e6z (8z + 13)− 60e3z − 3
)
.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 3.5
Lemma A.7. For θ > 0, as N ↑ ∞,
θv>v −→ 9(1 + 2e
3ρT )2
4(1− 2e3ρT (5 + 3ρT ))2 ,
θw>w −→ 1
4(ρT + 1)2
.
Proof. As for the first limit, since (Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id)ν = 1 and Γ = Γ˜ + Γ˜>, we have
ν>1 = ν>Γν + ν>Γ˜ν + 2θν>ν = 3ν>Γ˜ν + 2θν>ν.
Solving for θν>ν, applying the limiting formula for ν>1 from (33) and the one for ν>Γ˜ν from Lemma A.5,
and then simplifying the result leads to
lim
N↑∞
θν>ν =
e−6ρT (1 + 2e3ρT )2
144
.
Since v = (ν>1)−1ν, the preceding limit, another application of (33), and a straightforward computation
finally yield the asserted convergence of θv>v.
To prove the second limit, we use that (Γ− Γ˜ + 2θ Id)ω = 1 and that ω>(Γ− Γ˜)ω = ω>Γ˜>ω = ω>Γ˜ω.
Hence, using the limits from (39) and Lemma A.5,
θω>ω =
1
2
ω>1− 1
2
ω>Γ˜ω −→ ρT + 1
2
− 2ρT + 1
4
=
1
4
as N ↑ ∞.
Since w = (1>ω)−1ω, the preceding limit and another application of (39) conclude the proof.
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Proof of Corollary 3.5. We have
TRN = θξ
>ξ + θη>η =
1
2
(
θv>v + θw>w).
Therefore, the formula for the limit of TRN follows from Lemma A.7. Next, we get from Theorem 3.2 and
a tedious though straightforward computation that
lim inf
N↑∞
(TRN − TCN ) = lim
N↑∞
(TR2N − TC2N )
=
(x+ y)2 3
(
2e3ρT + 1
)2 (
3(ρT + 3) + 2e6ρT (3ρT + 5)− e3ρT (12ρT + 19)
)
2
(
1− 2e3ρT (3ρT + 5))2 (3ρT + e3ρT + 2e6ρT (3ρT + 5) + 7) .
Clearly, the latter expression vanishes for x = −y and it is strictly positive if and only if x 6= −y and
f(ρT ) > 0, where
f(z) := 3(z + 3) + 2e6z(3z + 5)− e3z(12z + 19).
But one easily sees that f(0) = 0 and f ′(z) = 3(e3z − 1)(2e3z(11 + 6z) − 1) > 0 for all z > 0. This proves
the assertion.
B Proofs of Theorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.6
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof of Theorem 4.5 (a). Let X∗ and Y ∗ be as in (5) and θ = θ∗ = 1/4. A straightforward computation
yields that, for all t ∈ [0, T ],∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dY ∗s +
1
2
∆Y ∗t + 2θ∆X
∗
t = −
1
2
( x− y
ρT + 1
+
18(x+ y)
10 + 6ρT − e−3ρT
)
and ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dY ∗s +
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dX∗s +
1
2
∆X∗t + 2θ∆Y
∗
t =
1
2
( x− y
ρT + 1
− 18(x+ y)
10 + 6ρT − e−3ρT
)
.
Proposition 4.10 therefore implies that (X∗, Y ∗) is a Nash equilibrium in Xdet(x, [0, T ]) ×Xdet(y, [0, T ]).
Thus, Lemma 4.9 yields that (X∗, Y ∗) is a Nash equilibrium also in X (x, [0, T ]) × X (y, [0, T ]). The
uniqueness of the latter Nash equilibrium was proved in Proposition 4.8. This concludes the proof of part
(a).
Proof of Theorem 4.5 (b). Now we consider the case θ 6= θ∗ = 1/4. Suppose first that x = y = 0. It is
obvious from Proposition 4.10 that X∗ = Y ∗ = 0 is a Nash equilibrium in Xdet(0, [0, T ]) ×Xdet(0, [0, T ]).
Lemma 4.9 and Proposition 4.8 thus yield that this is also the unique Nash equilibrium in X (0, [0, T ]) ×
X (0, [0, T ]).
Now we will prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium implies the condition x = y = 0. To this
end, let (X∗, Y ∗) be a Nash equilibrium in X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]).
Step 1. In the first step of the proof, we show that X∗ and Y ∗ are necessarily continuous on [0, T ). To
this end, we pick ε > 0 and define τ := inf{t > 0 | |∆X∗t | ≥ ε} ∧ T . Then τ is a stopping time for the
right-continuous filtration (Ft)t≥0. Next, we take a sequence (τn) of stopping times satisfying the following
three conditions: τ ≤ τn ≤ T ; on {τ < T} we have τn ↓ τ P-a.s.; and on {τn < T} we have ∆X∗τn = ∆Y ∗τn = 0
P-a.s. The existence of such a sequence will be proved in Lemma B.1 below.
Since the total variations of X∗(ω) and Y ∗(ω) are uniformly bounded in ω, dominated convergence yields
that
lim
n↑∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|τn−s| dX∗s
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|τ−s| dX∗s
]
. (40)
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and that
lim
n↑∞
E
[ ∫
[0,τn)
e−ρ(τn−s) dY ∗s
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,τ ]
e−ρ(τ−s) dY ∗s
]
. (41)
Now let η be as in Proposition 4.11. Then (40) and (41) yield that
η = lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|τn−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,τn)
e−ρ(τn−s) dY ∗s +
1
2
∆Y ∗τn + 2θ∆X
∗
τn
∣∣∣Fτ]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|τ−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,τ ]
e−ρ(τ−s) dY ∗s +
(1
2
∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X
∗
T
)
1{τ=T}
∣∣∣Fτ]. (42)
On the other hand, taking σ = τ in (11) yields that
η = E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|τ−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,τ)
e−ρ(τ−s) dY ∗s +
1
2
∆Y ∗τ + 2θ∆X
∗
τ
∣∣∣Fτ]. (43)
By subtracting (43) from (42), we obtain(1
2
∆Y ∗τ − 2θ∆X∗τ
)
1{τ<T} = 0.
Keeping the definition of τ but otherwise reversing the roles of X∗ and Y ∗ in the preceding argument gives(1
2
∆X∗τ − 2θ∆Y ∗τ
)
1{τ<T} = 0.
In view of our assumption θ 6= 1/4 and the definition of τ we must conclude that τ = T P-a.s. Sending ε
to zero along a countable sequence now yields that X∗ must be continuous on [0, T ). Reversing the roles of
X∗ and Y ∗ in the entire argument gives the same result for Y ∗.
Step 2. We will show here that ∆X∗T = ∆Y
∗
T = 0. To this end, let (τn)n∈N be a sequence of strictly
positive stopping times such that τn ↑ T . For each n ∈ N, let
(
σnm
)
m∈N be a sequence of stopping times
such that σnm ≥ τn and σnm ↑ T as m ↑ ∞. For each τn, let ηn be as in Proposition 4.11. We know from the
preceding step that X∗ and Y ∗ are continuous on [0, T ), so that ∆Y ∗σnm = ∆X
∗
σnm
= 0. We therefore have
ηn = lim
m↑∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|σ
n
m−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,σnm)
e−ρ(σ
n
m−s) dY ∗s
∣∣∣Fτn]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|T−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,T )
e−ρ(T−s) dY ∗s
∣∣∣Fτn]. (44)
On the other hand, we also have
ηn = E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|T−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,T )
e−ρ(T−s) dY ∗s +
1
2
∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X
∗
T
∣∣∣Fτn]. (45)
Comparing (44) and (45) yields that
E
[1
2
∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X
∗
T
∣∣∣Fτn] = 0. (46)
Reversing the roles of X∗ and Y ∗ yields that
E
[1
2
∆X∗T + 2θ∆Y
∗
T
∣∣∣Fτn] = 0. (47)
Sending n to infinity and using martingale convergence together with the fact that σ(
⋃∞
n=0Fτn) = FT−
yields that we may replace Fτn in (46) and (47) by FT−. But the fact that X∗T = Y
∗
T = 0 implies
that ∆X∗T = −X∗T− and ∆Y ∗T = −Y ∗T− are FT−-measurable. Thus, P-a.s., 12∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X∗T = 0 and
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1
2∆X
∗
T + 2θ∆Y
∗
T = 0. Our assertion ∆X
∗
T = ∆Y
∗
T = 0 now follows as in the first step of the proof by using
the assumption θ 6= 1/4.
Step 3. We now prove ∆X∗0 = ∆Y ∗0 = 0. Proceeding analogously to Step 2, we let τ = 0 and take a
sequence of deterministic times sn ↓ 0. As before, an application of Proposition 4.11 yields that
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρt dX∗t +
1
2
∆Y ∗0 + 2θ∆X
∗
0
]
= lim
n↑∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|sn−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,sn)
e−ρ(sn−t) dY ∗t
]
.
After exchanging limit and integration, we arrive at 12∆Y
∗
0 = 2θ∆X
∗
0 . Reversing the roles of X
∗ and Y ∗
gives 12∆X
∗
0 = 2θ∆Y
∗
0 , and as above our assumption θ 6= 14 yields ∆X∗0 = ∆Y ∗0 = 0.
Step 4. In this step, we will show that X∗t = Y ∗t P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. To this end, we take an arbitrary
[0, T ]-valued stopping time τ and apply Proposition 4.11 to obtain two Fτ -measurable random variables η1
and η2 such that for all stopping times σ with τ ≤ σ ≤ T ,
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|σ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
e−ρ(σ−t) dY ∗t
∣∣∣Fτ] = η1,
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|σ−t| dY ∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
e−ρ(σ−t) dX∗t
∣∣∣Fτ] = η2. (48)
Here we have used the already established continuity of X∗ and Y ∗ on [0, T ]. Subtracting the first equation
in (48) from the second one yields
E
[ ∫
[σ,T ]
e−ρ(t−σ) d(X∗t − Y ∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ] = η1 − η2.
Setting σ = T and using that ∆X∗T = ∆Y
∗
T = 0 yields that η1 − η2 = 0. Taking then σ = τ yields
E
[ ∫
[τ,T ]
e−ρt d(X∗t − Y ∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ]eρτ = 0 P-a.s.
That is,
E
[ ∫
[τ,T ]
e−ρt d(X∗t − Y ∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ] = 0 P-a.s. for all [0, T ]-valued stopping times τ .
It follows that Mt :=
∫
[0,t] e
−ρs d(X∗s − Y ∗s ) is a continuous martingale of bounded variation and hence
constant in t. Taking derivatives with respect to t yields our claim that X∗t = Y ∗t P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In
particular, we must have that x = X∗0− = X∗0 = Y ∗0 = Y ∗0− = y.
Step 5. Since X∗ and Y ∗ are optimal strategies, Proposition 4.11 applies. In particular, Equation (11)
holds for τ = 0 and every σ = t ∈ [0, T ]. Given that X∗ = Y ∗ has no jumps, we conclude that there exists
a constant η such that
η = E
[
2
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s) dX∗s +
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s) dX∗s
]
= E
[
2
(
X∗t − e−ρtX∗0 − ρ
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)X∗s ds
)
+ eρ(t−T )X∗T −X∗t − ρ
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)X∗s ds
]
= −2e−ρtx+ E[X∗t ]− 2ρ
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds+ ρ
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds
(49)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The second equality follows from Stieltjes integration by parts, the third from interchanging
expectation and integration. Define
f(t) := ρ
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds− ρ
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
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Notice that f is continuously differentiable. Plugging in from (49), we see that f solves an ordinary differ-
ential equation:
f ′(t) = −ρ2
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds− ρ2
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds+ 2ρE[X∗t ]
= −ρ2
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds− ρ2
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds
+ 2ρ
(
η + 2e−ρtx+ 2ρ
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds− ρ
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds
)
= 3ρf(t) + 2ρ
(
η + 2e−ρtx
)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Define further
g(t) := E[X∗t ]− ρ
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Then (49) is equivalent to
g(t) = η + 2e−ρtx+ 2f(t) (50)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], showing that g is differentiable and solves an ordinary differential equation as well:
g′(t) = −2ρe−ρtx+ 6ρf(t) + 4ρ(η + 2e−ρtx)
= −2ρe−ρtx+ 3ρ(g(t)− η − 2e−ρtx)+ 4ρ(η + 2e−ρtx)
= 3ρg(t) + ρη
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. It follows from Step 2 and Definition 4.1 that g(T ) = E[X∗T ] = 0. Furthermore, letting
t = T in (50) yields f(T ) = −(η + 2e−ρTx)/2. Solving the ordinary differential equations above with these
boundary conditions shows
f(t) =
e−3ρ(T−t) − 4
6
η − e−ρtx and g(t) = e
−3ρ(T−t) − 1
3
η, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
According to Step 4, E[X∗0 ] = x, hence
x = g(0)− f(0) = e
−3ρT + 2
6
η + x.
We conclude η = 0, which implies g(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Now notice that
d
dt
[ ∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds
]
= −E[X∗t ] + ρ
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds = −g(t) = 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. It follows that∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds =
∫ T
T
eρ(t−s)E[X∗s ] ds = 0,
and therefore E[X∗t ] = g(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, x = E[X∗0 ] = 0.
Lemma B.1. Let X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]), Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]), and τ be a stopping time with τ ≤ T . Then there
exists a sequence (τn) of stopping times satisfying the following three conditions: τ ≤ τn ≤ T ; on {τ < T}
we have τn ↓ τ P-a.s.; and on {τn < T} we have ∆X∗τn = ∆Y ∗τn = 0 P-a.s.
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Proof. For each ω, the functions t 7→ Xt(ω) and t 7→ Yt(ω) are of bounded variation and hence can be
written as differences of increasing functions X±t (ω), Y
±
t (ω). That is, Xt(ω) = x + X
+
t (ω) − X−t (ω) and
Yt(ω) = y + Y
+
t (ω)− Y −t (ω). As a matter of fact, X+t (ω) can be taken as the total variation of X(ω) over
the interval [0, t], and X−t (ω) = x+X
+
t (ω)−Xt(ω). Then both X+ and X− are adapted, and they are also
right-continuous. Now take a strictly increasing function φ mapping [0,∞) bijectively onto [0, 1). Then,
for Zt := X
+
τ+t +X
−
τ+t + Y
+
τ+t + Y
−
τ+t, the function f(t) := E[φ(Zt) ] is right-continuous and increasing and
so has only countably many discontinuity points (recall from Definition 4.1 that Xt and Yt are defined for
all t ≥ 0). Hence, for each n, there exists tn ∈ [2−n, 2−n−1) such that f(tn) − f(tn−) = 0. Dominated
convergence implies that f(t−) = E[φ(Zt−) ] and in turn that ∆Ztn = 0 P-a.s. By construction, this entails
that also ∆Xtn = ∆Ytn = 0 P-a.s. Hence, letting τn := (τ + tn) ∧ T yields the desired sequence of stopping
times.
B.2 Proof of Corollary 4.6
Define the two functions
ϕ± (t) := −ρ
3 (x+ y)
(
e3ρT + 2e3ρt
)
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1 ±
x− y
2 (ρT + 1)
 .
Let ϕ′± denote the first derivative of ϕ±. We see that dX∗t = ϕ+ (t) dt and dY ∗t = ϕ− (t) dt on (0, T ). In
addition,
∆X∗0 = ∆Y
∗
0 = −
3 (x+ y) (2e3ρT + 1)
2
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1) , and ∆X∗T = −∆Y ∗T = − x− y2 (ρT + 1) .
It holds that ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dX∗s dX
∗
t
=
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
e−ρ|t−s|ϕ′+ (s)ϕ
′
+ (t) ds dt+
(
∆X∗0
)2
+ 2e−ρT∆X∗0∆X
∗
T
+
(
∆X∗T
)2
+ 2∆X∗0
∫ T
0
e−ρtϕ′+ (t) dt+ 2∆X
∗
T
∫ T
0
e−ρ(T−t)ϕ′+ (t) dt,
and (using the fact that ∆Y ∗0 = ∆X∗0 ):∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dY ∗s dX
∗
t =
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)ϕ′− (s)ϕ
′
+ (t) ds dt+ e
−ρT∆X∗0∆X
∗
T
+ ∆X∗0
∫ T
0
e−ρtϕ′+ (t) dt+ ∆X
∗
T
∫ T
0
e−ρ(T−t)ϕ′− (t) dt.
The computation of the integrals is straightforward:∫ T
0
e−ρ|t−s|ϕ′+ (s) ds
=
3 (x+ y)
(
−4e3ρT + e3ρt + e−ρt
(
2e3ρT + 1
))
2
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1) + (x− y)
(
e−ρ(T−t) + e−ρt − 2
)
2 (ρT + 1)
,
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and then:
1
2
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
e−ρ|t−s|ϕ′+ (s)ϕ
′
+ (t) ds dt
=
3 (x+ y)2
(
3ρTe6ρT − e3ρT + 1
)
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1)2 +
(
x2 − y2) (e3ρT (12ρT − 7) + 6e2ρT + 3e−ρT − 2)
4
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1) (ρT + 1)
+
(x− y)2
(
e−ρT + ρT − 1
)
4 (ρT + 1)2
.
Similarly, ∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)ϕ′− (s) ds
=
3 (x+ y)
(
−2e3ρT − e3ρt + e−ρt
(
2e3ρT + 1
))
2
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1) + (x− y)
(
1− e−ρt)
2 (ρT + 1)
,
and: ∫ T
0
∫ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)ϕ′− (s)ϕ
′
+ (t) ds dt
=
3 (x+ y)2
(
3ρTe6ρT − e3ρT + 1
)
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1)2 +
(
x2 − y2) (−3e3ρT + 6e2ρT + 3e−ρT − 6)
4
(
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1) (ρT + 1)
−
(x− y)2
(
e−ρT + ρT − 1
)
4 (ρT + 1)2
.
Finally, we see that ∫ T
0
e−ρtϕ′+ (t) dt = ∆X
∗
0
2e3ρT − 2
2e3ρT + 1
+ ∆X∗T
(
1− e−ρT
)
,
and ∫ T
0
e−ρ(T−t)
(
ϕ′+ (t) + ϕ
′
− (t)
)
dt = 2∆X∗0
3e3ρT − 2e2ρT − e−ρT
2e3ρT + 1
.
Adding all components and simplifying yields the assertion.
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